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From the politico-economic perspective, federalism is a protector of the present generation. But what 
about future generations? In federal states, Ricardian equivalence cannot be assumed to work properly, 
as migration between local jurisdictions undermines intergenerational redistribution based on parental 
altruism. However, we argue that there exists another equivalence mechanism which also works with 
purely selfish individuals: Public debts capitalize into property values. Jurisdictions with larger net 
debts exhibit, ceteris paribus, lower property prices. Debt capitalization in property values is the more 
pronounced the less elastic land supply is and the more mobile the other factors of production are. 
Therefore, capitalization is more relevant for local than for national debts, i.e. it is more pronounced in 
a federal than in a centralized state. Thus, federalism also becomes a protector of future generations.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
From the politico-economic perspective, federalism is a protector of the 
current generation. It protects citizens from exploitation by establishing fiscal 
equivalence and competition between local governments, thus strengthening 
the incentives for politicians to cater to efficiency. But what about future 
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 generations? If individuals are as selfish as is commonly assumed in economics, 
they are clearly interested in living at the expense of future generations by 
financing government spending by debts rather than by taxation. Of course, 
there is the well-known counterargument of Ricardian equivalence which states 
that the debt burden cannot be shifted to future generations as the present 
generation reacts to debt spending by increasing savings. However, the 
assumptions for Ricardian equivalence to hold are quite demanding. It starts 
from the presumption that the utility of future generations enters into the 
utility function of the present generation. While this is obviously true in a 
model with overlapping generations and parental altruism, it may not reflect 
reality. Many individuals have no descendants and, thus, no obvious reason to 
care about the debt burden of future generations. Moreover, migration may 
help to circumvent the repayment obligations for debts. It could therefore be 
argued that the debt burden can be shifted to future generations. 
This argument is all the more convincing in a federal state where citizens can 
safely assume there being a good chance that their own kids will migrate to 
another jurisdiction, and that the debts of the jurisdiction where they presently 
live will have to be repaid by new inhabitants. Therefore, it could be argued 
that at the sub-national level fiscal responsibility gets blurred, which induces 
citizens and politicians to prefer debt over tax financing, thus making 
federalism an exploiter of future generations. 
Fortunately, reality looks different: There is another mechanism that makes 
federalism not only a protector of the present, but also of future generations: 
the capitalization of jurisdictional assets and debts into property prices. In open 
economies such as small countries or local jurisdictions, the price of housing 
reflects individual preferences for packages of public services and tax prices. 
Capitalization occurs when, for given housing and demographic characteristics, 
the difference in local property values reflects differences in taxes and public 
services. As is well known, the quality of government services and the level of 
taxation indeed capitalize to a large extent.1 There is no reason why debts 
should not also capitalize.  
In fact, we are not the first to think about debt capitalization (see e.g. Eichenberger, 
2007; Stadelmann and Eichenberger, 2008). Daly (1969) had already pinpointed it long 
ago. But capitalization of public debts has played no role in the literature since 
then and has only been rediscovered recently (see Banzhaf and Oates, 2008). 
                                                 
1 Among others, Oates (1969, 1973), Pollakowski (1973), Edel and Sclar (1974), Chinloy (1978), 
Reinhard (1981), Yinger et al. (1988), Brasington (2002), and Reback (2005) consider the 
capitalization of taxes and/or public goods. 
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 Note that our approach and Barro’s (1989) theory do not exclude each other 
but are complementary. For small jurisdictions, however, our approach relies 
on less demanding behavioral assumptions. Moreover, according to Barro 
empirical studies do not provide consistent support for his theory. He 
attributes this to identification problems and the simultaneity between 
consumption and income. In contrast, we argue that our approach suffers 
much less from these problems as endogeneity problems are usually less 
pronounced when the dependent variables are housing prices.2 
For a first test of our theory of debt capitalization in a federal state, we 
analyze the prices of standardized single family houses for the 171 
communities of the Swiss Canton of Zurich. Swiss cantons form a particularly 
good fiscal laboratory for our purposes for at least four reasons: (1) each of 
them is a small federation of its own as Swiss municipalities have a high level 
of autonomy with respect to local income taxation and financing decisions; (2) 
all municipalities in Zurich use a common harmonized public accounting 
system for budgeting, bookkeeping with balance sheets, and reporting which 
facilitates comparisons of fiscal variables; (3) they have free access to capital 
markets; and (4) the Swiss federal court prohibits higher government levels 
from bailing out municipalities. Thus, Switzerland forms an ideal setting for 
identifying how public debts capitalize in a federal state.  
Municipal real net funds as the difference between financial assets minus 
liabilities and municipal equity are commonly used indicators in government 
publications.3 We show that municipal net funds and municipal equity 
capitalize positively. Several specification tests for a number of different 
measures of communal wealth lead to the same conclusions. The effects found 
are not only statistically significant, but also economically highly relevant, thus 
bolstering the capitalization-based theory of equivalence of debt and tax 
financing for the local public sector. Most countries do help lower levels of 
government when they are in financial distress, but compared to other 
countries Switzerland has only a minor system of equalization grants. Our 
results are also robust when controlling for implicit bail-out through fiscal 
equalization by higher government levels. Thus, the political fight over deficits 
                                                 
2 The results of numerous studies differ little when comparing OLS and IV estimates. 
Experimental studies find similar price impacts for diverse variables with respect to signs and often 
also sizes (see, for example, Black, 1999; or Chay and Greenstone, 2005). Thus, most recent articles 
on capitalization of variables other than debts do not focus on endogeneity problems (see, for 
example, Stull and Stull, 1991; Palmon and Smith, 1998; or Brasington, 2001, 2002). Bajari and 
Kahn (2005) call this a common practice in the hedonic literature. 
3 The Statistical Office of the Canton of Zürich writes in its press release Statistik.info 21/2003 that 
the most important financial indicator on the balance sheet is “net funds” (translated from German). 
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 and debts is no intergenerational conflict, but an intragenerational conflict 
between today’s property owners and today’s tenants. 
We are aware that in real life the capitalization mechanism is affected by 
various identifiable conditions. Two types of such conditions may be 
discerned. The first group comprises conditions such as housing market 
inefficiencies due to moving costs, slow adjustment mechanisms, and fiscal 
illusion as proposed by Buchanan (1964). Under such conditions capitalization 
still holds in the long run but is slow and more erratic in the short run. Thus, if 
a short run increase of debt spending occurs, there are losers and winners who 
have incentives to lobby for and against debt spending, respectively (see 
Eichenberger and Stadelmann, 2009). Second, there are factors such as partial bailout 
expectations and fiscal equalization schemes that explicitly or implicitly transfer 
the debt obligations from one community to others or to higher government 
levels. These factors weaken capitalization at the local level but transfer it to 
the higher level, thus offering local jurisdictions partial incentives to opt for 
debts. Thus, in countries with substantial systems of equalization grants, 
capitalization of debts at the local level is likely to be lower. However, 
equalization grants do not completely annihilate the proposed mechanism but 
rather transfer it to a higher federal level. In countries with large systems of 
equalization at the local level but mobile individuals, debts are likely to 
capitalize partly at the local and partly at the regional level.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 first reviews 
two branches of the literature which are important for our argument. It shortly 
presents Barro’s equivalence and looks at the literature on capitalization of 
taxes and public goods. Then it discusses the theoretical underpinnings of debt 
capitalization. Section 3 introduces our data and the econometric procedure. 
Section 4 presents our econometric results, and section 5 concludes. 
2. RELATED LITERATURE AND THEORY 
2.1. RELATED LITERATURE 
The traditional view of government debts presumes that when governments cut 
taxes and run deficits consumers increase their spending, thus shifting the debt 
burden to future generations. Barro (1974) considers an alternative view of 
government budget deficits. In an overlapping generations model where 
households act as though they lived infinitely, government debts have no effect 
on consumption as (altruistic) individuals increase their savings, which allows 
future generations to pay back the debts. Therefore, a tax cut financed by new 
government debts does not reduce the tax burden for the present generation, it 
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 simply reschedules it. It is important to note that Barro’s results are generated by 
assuming intergenerationally dependent preferences which effectively create an 
infinite time horizon although each individual member of a generation has only a 
finite lifetime. This view on budget deficits was labeled by Buchanan (1976) and 
others, as well as by Barro (1989) himself, as the “Ricardian equivalence.” To 
establish the equivalence of taxes and public debts, loan markets must be perfect, 
individuals must be certain about their future income, and taxation must not be 
distortive. However, market imperfections do not annihilate but only weaken the 
correspondence between taxes and budget deficits.  
While Ricardian equivalence is dependent on highly specific assumptions, we 
focus on another mechanism which induces a correspondence between taxes 
and public debts. It works through the housing and land market. By 
accumulating debts, a community is only able to alter the time distribution of 
explicit tax payments. If the debt-issuing generation wants to sell its property it 
faces lower values when large obligations have been accumulated in the past. 
The buying generation bids less for the assets because they have to pay back 
the accumulated debts through higher taxes in the future. Debts therefore 
reduce the price for the current generations’ properties which makes them 
bear the burden. While this argument is surprising to many economists and is 
not mentioned in academic and public debates on debts and deficits, it has 
already been brought forward by Daly (1969). 
In the same year, Oates (1969) argued in a path-breaking study that consumers 
migrate to the jurisdiction offering the tax/public services package which is 
best suited to their preferences. Differences in these fiscal packages are then 
reflected in the price of housing that individuals are willing to pay to live in a 
certain location, providing a first test for the Tiebout (1956) hypothesis. Oates’ 
regressions confirm capitalization of both property taxes and public goods 
which are approximated by public expenditures. Following Oates, a number of 
well-known papers in public finance defend an opposite view. Starting with a 
critical comment from Pollakowski (1973) and an immediate reply from Oates 
(1973), authors like Edel and Sclar (1974) and Hamilton (1976) argue against 
capitalization of fiscal variables such as taxes, expenditures or public services 
into housing prices. Brueckner (1979) provides an excellent survey of this 
academic discussion. Starrett (1981) and Yinger (1982) finally conclude the 
intellectual debate after more than a decade by providing theoretical models 
that validate the capitalization of fiscal differences in the long run. 
Empirical literature following the first capitalization studies mainly differs 
with respect to the degrees found for capitalization of diverse variables and the 
hypotheses tested. The literature finds that apart from differentials in taxes and 
public services, variables such as school quality, environmental quality, 
How Federalism Protects Future Generations / 399
DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1539
 neighborhood characteristics, etc. are partly or fully capitalized into property 
values. A comprehensive study of capitalization was done by Yinger et al. (1988). 
Other and more recent capitalization analyses include Stull and Stull (1991), 
Palmon and Smith (1998), Epple and Sieg (1999), and Brasington (2002), among 
others. Property values have also been used as a proxy for the valuation of public 
goods. Black (1999), Figlio and Lucas (2004), and Reback (2005) are some of the 
numerous examples. Fischel (2001) argues that property owners as watchful 
citizens of local governments counteract possible risks to their assets.  
Interestingly, of all these capitalization studies none looks at the capitalization 
of public debts. Nevertheless, there exists some related literature. There are 
some few papers which analyze the effect of unfunded liabilities of pension 
plans on municipal property prices. In a comprehensive literature search we 
found two contributions only: Epple and Schipper (1981) emphasize the problem 
of finding good measures for the local underfunding problem of pensions as 
actuarial assumptions vary between different jurisdictions, making it difficult to 
estimate the precise obligations. They find some capitalization effects for 
municipalities in the Pittsburgh area but they mention that additional empirical 
research on the question is needed. In a similar setting, Leeds (1985) considers 67 
municipalities in the Chicago area. As a measure for unfunded liabilities he uses 
the ratio of the payments by the pension fund to the assets held by it. He does 
not find any significant coefficients in the regression analysis for his 
underfunding measure but suggests that underfunded pensions have an indirect 
effect on property values via taxes. The actions of previous political generations 
affect current taxes and thereby house prices. Consequently, underfunding is a 
form of hidden taxation and politically motivated. Both contributions partly 
attribute their moderately significant results to the difficult data situation and 
weak municipal accounting systems. The authors state that the evidence for the 
capitalization of unfunded liabilities is inconsistent and further empirical 
research might shed light on the underlying mechanisms. 
2.2. THEORETICAL MECHANISM 
The effectiveness of federalism as a protector for future generations depends on 
the existence of capitalization in general and debt capitalization in particular.  
Intuitively, debt capitalization works as follows: Individuals form expectations 
on the future development of real estate values. The capitalization literature 
confirms that the demand for property depends on the quality of public services 
and the tax price. Both variables depend on the debt burden. If the present 
generation expects future house prices to rise due to, among other factors, high 
net assets or low net debts, individuals already bid more for houses today causing 
present prices to rise. On the other hand, communities with negative prospects 
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 due to high net debts will see declining house prices even today. Therefore, it is 
not the future generation who bear the burden of government debts but present 
property owners. Consequently, we expect property prices to be lower in 
communities with lower net assets and higher net debts, respectively. 
The extent of capitalization depends on the relative supply elasticities of the 
various factors of production. If the supply of land is inelastic and the other 
factors of production (labor and capital) are mobile, the whole future tax 
burden has to be carried by land. Thus, there is full capitalization, which means 
that present land owners are carrying the burden. In contrast, when labor is not 
mobile it also carries part of the burden. While the former conditions are 
typical for local jurisdictions, the latter apply to national economies. Therefore, 
debt capitalization is more relevant to local government debt than to central 
government debt. This sets a natural brake on local government debts which 
protects future generations from the debt burden. In contrast, at the national 
level capitalization is less relevant, which allows shifting at least part of the debt 
burden to future generations. 
But what do we know about the relative supply elasticities of land and other 
factors of production? It can be safely assumed that land is rather inelastic, 
particularly when compared to labor and capital in a metropolitan area of a 
federal state. Thus, land owners should carry the burden of low municipal assets 
and high municipal debts. However, capitalization of net funds also depends on 
the absolute elasticity of the supply of land for construction in general and the 
institutional mechanism which determines zoning. Edel and Sclar (1974) and 
Hamilton (1976) claim that the supply of jurisdictions can be increased in the 
long run. Therefore, the supply of any arbitrary tax/public service combination 
is perfectly elastic. In this case competition between land developers equalizes 
differentials in house values and fiscal variables have no influence on prices. If 
the supply of land were perfectly elastic, a shift in demand due to changes in 
public debts and assets would have no effect on prices. On the other hand, 
Yinger (1981, 1982) argues that the supply of land of a given quality, i.e. land 
which exhibits a specific tax/public service combination, cannot be perfectly 
elastic because it always involves opportunity costs for the land developers. 
Housing prices are not only influenced by fiscal variables but also by other 
factors such as local amenities. Additionally, tax revenue does not translate as 
directly into public services for all communities as supposed by the above-
mentioned authors. Lastly, the maximum capacity of a residential area is fixed 
in each jurisdiction and nonresidential land cannot be converted endlessly. 
Consequently, the supply of housing must become inelastic when approaching 
full capacity, particularly in urban areas. In the long-run equilibrium, for a 
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 sufficiently high population density, such as in a metropolitan area, no more 
conversions are possible and local fiscal variables will be fully capitalized.  
Clearly, the absolute elasticity of supply is an empirical question and depends 
on various factors. In Switzerland, for instance, the area which can be used for 
construction of buildings has only increased by about 2.7 percent in total 
between 1994 and 2006, and in the Canton of Zurich the area available for 
housing has actually decreased over the same period although the population 
has grown by about 10 percent. It is also evident that in more densely 
populated regions supply cannot be perfectly elastic.  
3. DATA  
We evaluate whether federalism protects future generations through debt 
capitalization by analyzing data from 169 communities in the metropolitan area of 
Zurich, Switzerland. The city of Zurich is the center of the largest urban 
agglomeration in Switzerland with over one million people living and working 
there. The Canton (Swiss form of State) of Zurich is the largest of all 26 Swiss 
cantons and has approximately 1.3 million inhabitants. The metropolitan area 
consists of 171 municipalities (including the city of Zurich and the city of 
Winterthur). Heterogeneity is driven by, among other factors, the widely differing 
size of the communities (from 251 to 29321 inhabitants, excluding Zurich and 
Winterthur), their distance to the economic centers, and their orientation towards 
the Zurichsee, a large (88.66 km2) lake in the canton.4  
Each community in the Canton determines its own income tax rates by 
annually fixing a municipal tax multiplier on the state income tax 
(“allgemeine Staatssteuer”) which is a progressive income tax schedule at the 
cantonal level. This highly decentralized form of income tax is typical for 
Switzerland and finances over 80% of communal expenditures in the Canton 
of Zurich. Municipal tax rates are set either by the citizens in a town meeting 
or by the municipal parliament. By international standards, the municipalities 
have large autonomy with respect to public expenditures and local regulations, 
although the cantonal as well as the federal governments set minimum 
standards for the provision of various public goods. Minimum standards 
reduce the problem of errors in the measurement and the comparison of 
public goods between jurisdictions that is inherent in most capitalization 
studies according to Palmon and Smith (1998). 
                                                 
4 Supplementary information on the Canton and the City of Zurich are available in the 
“Statistisches Jahrbuch des Kantons Zürich, 2008, Statistisches Amt des Kantons Zürich, Zürich.” 
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 In 1982 the canton’s municipalities introduced a harmonized public accounting 
system for budgeting and bookkeeping. These standards require all communities 
to follow the same legal framework concerning their current and capital 
accounts. In addition, they demand an annual financial statement and a balance 
sheet in which assets are included at acquisition values minus amortization. The 
balance sheet along with other bookkeeping standards distinguishes the Swiss 
communal finance framework from most other countries (see Oster, 2006). Swiss 
communes have full autonomy from higher government levels in domains such 
as the acquisition, the use, or the disposition of assets. Communities associate 
local self-rule in asset management with autonomy and federalism which makes 
it almost a holy issue.5 
An important facet of Swiss federalism is that communities can become 
insolvent when they accumulate debts that are too high, which distinguishes 
Swiss communities from communities in Germany, Austria and other 
European countries. The Swiss federal court prevented higher government 
levels from bailing out insolvent communities in the publicly well-known court 
case of the municipality of Leukerbad, a community in the Canton of Valais 
with approximately 2000 inhabitants. After Leukerbad went bankrupt with 
obligations mounting to 346 million Swiss francs (approximately 313 million 
US dollars), a number of creditors issued lawsuits against the canton to settle 
the community’s obligations. The federal court rejected all of them, arguing 
that Swiss communities act on their own responsibility in the federal system. 
Consequently, communities in our dataset will not be bailed out by higher 
government levels and have no strategic incentive to accumulate either debts or 
extensive budget deficits.  
As a result, the metropolitan area of Zurich is a perfect laboratory to identify 
whether federalism in the sense of fiscal decentralization protects future 
generations by capitalization of local assets and debts in private properties.  
We analyze the impact of municipal assets and debts on the average price of 
comparable single family houses over the years 1998 to 2004. These houses are 
characterized by five rooms, two bathrooms, 450m2 surface, 750m3 volume, 
end-terrace houses, conveniently situated in the municipality, and one garage 
space. The data was provided by the Cantonal Bank of Zurich, the market 
leader in real estate banking in the canton, which evaluates houses by the sales 
comparison approach based on actual transactions. Moreover, location-specific 
characteristics such as distance to the next school or the next shopping facility 
are available for each observation. By looking at a comparable house for each 
                                                 
5 See Dafflon (2006) for a detailed discussion concerning communal real property management 
in Switzerland as well as the harmonized public accounting system. 
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 municipality we can focus on differentials in debts, public services and 
amenities between communities. 
Our dataset includes a large number of variables which capture real estate 
specific aspects as well as aspects specific to the respective municipality such as 
taxes, real net funds, equity, public goods, and various demographic 
characteristics. These data were obtained from the Statistical Office of the Canton 
of Zurich (Statistisches Amt des Kantons Zürich), the Secretary for Education of 
the Canton of Zurich (Bildungsdirektion des Kantons Zürich), and the Financial 
Statistics of the Canton of Zurich (GEFIS Finanzstatistik des Kantons Zürich).  
As our primary variable of interest we use real net funds which are the main 
municipal financial assets (liquidities, assets, and equipment; adjusted for 
amortizations but excluding accruals) minus debts (regular obligations, short-
term debts and long-term debts excluding deferrals and provisions). Equity 
from the communal balance sheets serves as an additional variable to 
approximate a community’s asset and debt situation. For robustness tests we 
use two different measures reported by the Statistical Office: net funds (as real 
net funds but including accruals, deferrals and provisions) and self-financing 
per capita, which is a measure similar to the managerial Cash Flow. 
Local public goods are accounted for by aggregated public expenditures, the 
average class size in primary schools, proximity to schools, and an identifier for 
whether the school is managed by the community itself or a separate school 
community. We also control for a number of other demographic and socio-
economic variables in further robustness tests. Needless to say, we take 
account of local real estate characteristics by including variables for lake view, 
south-west exposure, proximity to the urban center, proximity to the next 
shop, environmental damage, and land available for construction use. 
Our dataset contains these variables for all municipalities in the canton and 
we average them over the same time period as the house price variable.6 All 
control variables, their sources, means and standard deviations are reported in 
Appendix Table A1.  
                                                 
6 In the analysis we do not include Zurich and Winterthur because, as opposed to the other 
municipalities, they are considered to be cities and have a different structure as they are 
composed of heterogeneous districts. Polinsky and Shavell (1976) show that using cross-section 
regressions to analyze the effect of amenities on house values is only valid when the 
communities are considered “small” and there is mobility within and among them. Zurich and 
Winterthur are large compared to the rest of the communities in the canton. We performed a 
number of robustness tests including the city of Zurich and Winterthur. Our main insights do 
not change when we include these two additional observations. 
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 4. ESTIMATION PROCEDURE AND RESULTS 
4.1. BASELINE ESTIMATES 
Figure 1 represents the central motivation for why federalism serves as a 
protector of future generations through debt capitalization. The scatterplots 
reveal the relationship between four measures of a community’s financial 
situation and house prices. The Box-Whisker-Plots next to the horizontal and 
vertical axes give an idea of the distribution of the variables. The box represents 
the first to the third quartile of the distribution containing the median. The 
whiskers extend to the most extreme data point which is no more than 1.5 times 
the interquartile range from the box. The dashed line represents the linear 
relationship between the variables. In order to take account of possible non-
linearities, we estimate a LOESS smoother (Local Polynomial Regression Fitting) 
with a smoother span of 0.75 which is represented by the solid line.  
Municipal real net funds as well as all other measures of a community’s 
financial situation show significant and positive correlations with house values. 
These positive correlations could be due to omitted variable bias. Therefore, 
we estimate a so-called amenity model to identify the impact of communal 
asset and debt measures on house prices. In such models,7 the measures of 
interest, municipal real net funds, equity, net funds and self-financing capacity 
can be included as additional variables besides common attributes such as 
location characteristics, income tax rates, etc. We use an amenity model of the 
following common specification form 
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where ip  represents the value of a comparable single family house in jurisdiction i 
averaged over the years 1998 to 2004. The coefficients jβ  for j=3,. . . ,C  
measure the impact of public goods, as well as other amenities such as 
demographic and location effects which were averaged over the same time 
period. The estimated coefficients of a municipality’s real net funds, equity, and 
the tax rates each represent the ceteris paribus impact of a change in a 
community’s wealth. Table 1 reports the results.  
                                                 
7 See, for example, Oates (1969) and the reactions to his paper (Stull and Stull, 1991, or 
Brasington, 1999). 
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 Figure 1. Property Values and Different Measures for Financial Situation 
  
 
  
Notes: The figures show the correlation between different measures of a community’s financial situation and 
log(house price). rho represents the correlation coefficient. The Box-Whisker-Plots on the x and y axis 
represent the distribution of the respective variables. The whiskers extend to the most extreme data point 
which is no more than 1.5 times the interquartile range from the box. The dashed line represents the linear 
relationship between the two variables. For the solid line, a LOESS smoother which uses locally polynomial 
regressions with smoother span 0.75 was applied. 
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Table 1. Public Debts and Property Prices –Results and Differential Hypotheses 
Spec. (1)  Spec. (2)  Spec. (3)  Spec. (4)  Spec. (5)  Spec. (6)  Spec. (7) Spec. (8)
RealNetFunds 4.4186**
(2.0989) 
4.4276**
(2.1212) 
4.3391*
(2.3231) 
8.7562**
(4.4228) 
Equity  7.6780***
(2.6209) 
7.6973***
(2.6349) 
7.0166**
(3.0483) 
18.9777***
(5.2137) 
IMaxTaxFunds     2.2121 
(4.8751) 
IMaxTaxEquity      4.5416 
(5.4740) 
ILandNetFunds       -0.0840
(0.0732) 
ILandEquity        -0.2148
(0.1930) 
Lake 0.0367***
(0.0054) 
0.0366***
(0.0053) 
0.0358***
(0.0055) 
0.0353***
(0.0053) 
0.0357***
(0.0055) 
0.0352***
(0.0053) 
0.0364***
(0.0053) 
0.0357***
(0.0050) 
SWExposure 87.3458***
(14.0799)
81.6828***
(13.5867) 
88.9897***
(13.9616) 
83.1091***
(13.5252) 
89.4154***
(13.8631) 
84.0491***
(13.4404) 
91.8842***
(13.9439) 
84.6233***
(13.0145)
DistCenter -5.9764***
(0.5945) 
-5.8966***
(0.6073) 
-6.2017***
(0.6422) 
-6.0556***
(0.6589) 
-6.2024***
(0.6373) 
-6.1136***
(0.6623) 
-6.3588***
(0.6401) 
-6.2300***
(0.6350) 
DistShop -0.0213***
(0.0054) 
-0.0190***
(0.0053) 
-0.0157**
(0.0061) 
-0.0137**
(0.0062) 
-0.0156**
(0.0061) 
-0.0134**
(0.0062) 
-0.0162***
(0.0062) 
-0.0134**
(0.0061) 
Pollution -7.0994***
(1.4380) 
-7.0318***
(1.4201) 
-7.8048***
(1.5701) 
-7.7383***
(1.5740) 
-7.8259***
(1.5883) 
-7.9475***
(1.6559) 
-7.5869***
(1.5698) 
-7.2990***
(1.5763) 
LandAvailable -0.4315**
(0.2087) 
-0.4489**
(0.2054) 
-0.4061**
(0.2071) 
-0.4247**
(0.2075) 
-0.4102**
(0.2085) 
-0.4230**
(0.2074) 
0.0144 
(0.3765) 
0.4798
(0.4272) 
TaxRate -2.6427***
(0.4966) 
-2.5035***
(0.4903) 
-2.6026***
(0.5057) 
-2.4873***
(0.4866) 
-2.6291***
(0.5142) 
-2.5506***
(0.5115) 
-2.5099***
(0.5039) 
-2.3034***
(0.4630) 
ExpAgg 0.1867***
(0.0276) 
0.1865***
(0.0269) 
0.1862***
(0.0274) 
0.1846***
(0.0266) 
0.1864***
(0.0271) 
0.1853***
(0.0264) 
0.1816***
(0.0271) 
0.1761***
(0.0270) 
DistSchool   -0.0379**
(0.0158) 
-0.0355**
(0.0157) 
-0.0379**
(0.0159) 
-0.0353**
(0.0158) 
-0.0389**
(0.0158) 
-0.0368**
(0.0152) 
ClassSize   2.2324 
(3.3782) 
2.3080 
(3.1960) 
2.4003 
(3.5692) 
2.2838 
(3.3030) 
2.4866 
(3.3093) 
3.2458
(3.0720) 
NoSchoolComm   2.2085 
(11.5765) 
6.1545 
(11.5850) 
2.4164 
(11.5559) 
6.7815 
(11.7173) 
0.2626 
(11.4971) 
4.0441
(11.5474)
DummyMaxTax     -4.0824
(15.3940) 
-11.1927
(18.1120) 
Intercept 1268.26***
(68.5117)
1237.48***
(68.6116) 
1261.88***
(100.1178)
1229.15***
(93.6669) 
1228.55***
(104.3384)
1144.48***
(97.1786) 
1228.55***
(104.3384)
1144.48***
(97.1786)
R2 0.8695 0.8729 0.8730 0.8762 0.8731 0.8766 0.8742 0.8809 
n. Obs. 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 
Notes: The left-hand-side variable in all regressions is the price of a standardized and comparable single 
family house across 169 municipalities. Robust standard errors using a White-Huber heteroskedasticity 
adjusted sandwich estimator in parenthesis. * * *  indicates significance levels of below 1 percent; * *  indicates 
significance levels between 1 and 5 percent; * indicates significance levels between 5 and 10 percent. 
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 If federalism induces debt capitalization, it follows that real net funds (and 
other measures for assets and debts of a community) should capitalize 
positively while income tax rates should exhibit a negative sign. Specification 
(1) fully supports our theoretical reasoning. The effect of municipal real net 
funds per capita is positive and significant at the 5% level. Income taxes 
capitalize negatively and significantly at the 1% level. As communal assets and 
debts reflect themselves in property values, the burden of low assets and high 
debts cannot be shifted to future generations and current land owners have to 
shoulder bad municipal finances.  
The monetary extent of capitalization of real net funds depends on the 
number of inhabitants per house and the debt burden which is financed by 
natural (as opposed to corporate) persons, which in turn depends on the share 
of capital taxes, the relative incomes of inhabitants as well as the progressivity 
of the tax schedule. Due to these influences and due to the fact that the size of 
the effects found are per house while our data for real net funds are on a per 
capita basis, we cannot directly calculate the extent of capitalization. To give a 
rough estimate we start from the fact that in the Canton of Zurich natural 
persons pay for about 80% of total tax receipts. If we assume that each house 
is inhabited by four persons and that these individuals are average taxpayers, 
we obtain from the coefficient value of real net funds in specification (1) an 
average capitalization rate for a 1% increase in real net funds of 138%.8  
All of our control variables have the expected signs as shown in specification (1). 
For lake view and south-west exposure, we unanimously anticipated and 
obtained positive coefficients, whereas for distance to the metropolitan center, 
distance to shops, and air pollution level, negative coefficients are observed. 
Land available for construction capitalizes negatively and significantly as more 
supply decreases prices. The coefficient of the aggregate spending for culture, 
health, administration, and social security is positive and significant as these 
expenditures serve as a measure for the provision of public goods. 
Specification (2) analyzes the effect of municipal equity per capita from balance 
sheets on house prices as another measure for a community’s asset and debt 
situation. Higher municipal equity increases house values significantly at the 1% 
level. Equity in balance sheets might suffer from evaluation standards concerning 
the commune’s administrative capital. Financial equalization transfers from the 
canton depend on a constructed index of financial power which also considers 
communal equity. As a result, communities have an incentive to report lower 
equity values per capita. The downward bias of municipal equity makes it possible 
                                                 
8 Overcapitalization is not uncommon in the literature: Oates (1973), Church (1974), and 
Reinhard (1981) report either full or overcapitalization.  
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 that the coefficient estimates are biased upwards. However, the incentive to 
report too-low equity is systematic for all municipalities, which indicates that a 
potential bias is symmetric for all communities. All control variables remain 
comparable in size and significance when compared to specification (1).  
In specifications (3) and (4) we control for various variables measuring school 
quality. Especially, estimates with data for the United States indicate that 
schools play a role in determining house prices (see Black, 1999; Figlio and Lucas, 2004; 
or Reback, 2005). For Switzerland, PISA Science Competencies Scores indicate 
that the between-school variance explained by the PISA index of the economic, 
social and cultural status of students and schools is lower than for most other 
OECD countries, which supports the common perception of generally small 
differences between school standards in Switzerland. In our empirical 
specifications, distance to the next school capitalizes negatively and significantly 
as it is more attractive to live nearer to schools. Class size in primary schools also 
negatively affects property prices as class size is an indicator for the quality of 
schooling. However, the coefficient’s standard error is high. Separate school 
communities might work more efficiently than unified communities (see Frey and 
Eichenberger, 2002) but the dummy does not yield any significant results. 
Concerning our main hypothesis of capitalization of assets and debts, we find 
that the inclusion of school-specific controls does not change the sign and 
both variables in columns (3) and (4) remain highly significant.  
Even though the Swiss federal court prevents higher federal levels from bailing-
out communities, there exist other ways of supporting communities in financial 
distress. Implicit forms of bail-out may potentially represent incentives for local 
governments to accumulate debt. Compared to other countries, Switzerland has 
no substantial system of equalization grants. However, communities with high 
tax rates are often in financial turmoil and may receive additional grants from the 
cantonal government. If communities with low assets and high debts obtain 
financial support, capitalization of municipal net funds and equity may decrease. 
To identify whether implicit bail-out reduces capitalization of debts, we interact 
our financial measures with a dummy which identifies communities with tax rates 
above the 80th decile (high tax communities). The results in columns (5) and (6) 
show that municipal real net funds and municipal equity capitalize both positively 
and significantly. The interaction terms (IMaxTaxFunds) in specification (5) and 
(IMaxTaxEquity) in specification (6) are positive but both far from significant 
which indicates that implicit bail-out by higher government levels plays a minor 
role for capitalization.  
We have indicated that capitalization of debts may depend on the elasticity of 
the supply of land. When enough land for construction is available, capitalization 
of fiscal differences between communities can be lower due to supply reactions by 
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 land developers. Data from 1994 to 2006 shows that total developed sites 
available in the Canton of Zurich increased only very slightly from 27762 to 28511 
hectares and land available for housing actually decreased during the same period 
from 14642 to 14040 hectares. On the other hand, cantonal population increased 
by over 10000 persons a year or 0.8% annually. This indicates that supply of land 
is likely to be close to its long-run equilibrium and that housing values mainly 
reflect tax/service combinations. Nevertheless, we interact our measure for 
available land for construction with real net funds and equity in specifications (7) 
and (8), respectively. The negative signs of the interaction terms indicate that 
capitalization of communal assets and debts is lower in communities with more 
available land but the coefficients are not statistically significant. Again, the burden 
of local public debts cannot be shifted to future generations as real net funds and 
equity capitalize significantly independent of land availability. 
So far we have shown that municipal real net funds and equity affect property 
values positively, which provides support for viewing federalism as a debt 
brake because of debt capitalization. Appendix Table A2 provides additional 
robustness tests using other controls together with real net funds and equity 
which confirm the baseline results. Next, we will analyze the influence on a 
community’s financial situation more closely by considering different 
specification tests and more indirect measures of municipal wealth. 
4.2. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
We investigate the effect of variations of the estimation equation and introduce 
additional measures for a community’s financial situation to show the 
robustness of our baseline results in Table 2.  
Specifications (1) and (2) show the results when estimating a semi-logarithmic 
form of the amenity model (see, for example, Brasington, 2001, 2002). In such a 
setting, the dependent variable is expressed in logs and all other variables enter 
the regression as in the standard setting. The results show that our main 
variables of interest, i.e. real net funds and municipal equity, remain both 
positive and significant. 
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 Table 2. Public Debts and Property Prices – Robustness Tests 
Spec.
log (1) 
Spec.
log (2)  
Spec.
(3) 
Spec.
log (4) 
Spec.
(5) 
Spec.
log (6) 
Spec.
(7) 
Spec.
log (8) 
RealNetFunds 
0.0039*
(0.0023) 
Equity  0.0068**
(0.0030) 
SelfFinancing   0.0650***
(0.0123) 
0.0001***
(1.4e-05) 
NetFunds     1.1749*
(0.6019) 
0.0036*
(0.0019) 
FundComponent       10.3717***
(3.2954) 
0.0096***
(0.0037) 
Lake  4.1e-05***  
(5.4e-06) 
4.1e-05***
(5.2e-06) 
0.0333***
(0.0049) 
3.9e-05***
(4.8e-06) 
0.0357***
(0.0057) 
4.2e-05***
(5.5e-06) 
0.0359***
(0.0053) 
4.2e-05***
(5.2e-06) 
SWExposure 0.1069***
(0.0153) 
0.1017***
(0.0150) 
83.5873***
(13.0321)
0.1020***
(0.0147) 
88.2533***
(13.6435)
0.1061***
(0.0150) 
85.0839***
(13.6437)
0.1033***
(0.0151) 
DistCenter -0.0084***
(0.0008) 
-0.0083***
(0.0008) 
-6.4254***
(0.6071) 
-0.0086***
(0.0007) 
-6.3868***
(0.6657) 
-0.0085***
(0.0008) 
-6.0060***
(0.6446) 
-0.0082***
(0.0008) 
DistShop -2.2e-05***
(7.5e-06) 
-2.0e-05***
(7.5e-06) 
-0.0155***
(0.0057) 
-2.2e-05***
(7.2e-06) 
-0.0161***
(0.0060) 
-2.2e-05***
(7.4e-06) 
-0.0147**
(0.0059) 
-2.1e-05***
(7.3e-06) 
Pollution -0.0089***
(0.0016) 
-0.0088***
(0.0016) 
-8.6286***
(1.6130) 
-0.0096***
(0.0017) 
-8.3380***
(1.6270) 
-0.0093***
(0.0017) 
-7.6312***
(1.5718) 
-0.0087***
(0.0016) 
LandAvailable -0.0005**
(0.0002) 
-0.0005**
(0.0002) 
-0.3868**
(0.1751) 
-0.0005**
(0.0002) 
-0.3095
(0.2007) 
-0.0005*
(0.0002) 
-0.4519**
(0.2007) 
-0.0006**
(0.0002) 
TaxRate -0.0027***
(0.0006) 
-0.0026***
(0.0005) 
-2.6324***
(0.4296) 
-0.0027***
(0.0005) 
-2.9114***
(0.5262) 
-0.0029***
(0.0006) 
-2.2955***
(0.5167) 
-0.0024***
(0.0006) 
ExpAgg 0.0002***
(2.7e-05) 
0.0002***
(2.6e-05) 
0.1658***
(0.0245) 
0.0002***
(2.5e-05) 
0.1885***
(0.0286) 
0.0002***
(2.7e-05) 
0.1856***
(0.0264) 
0.0002***
(2.6e-05) 
DistSchool -4.8e-05**
(1.9e-05) 
-4.6e-05**
(1.9e-05) 
-0.0390***
(0.0140) 
-4.9e-05***
(1.8e-05) 
-0.0389**
(0.0159) 
-4.8e-05**
(1.9e-05) 
-0.0350**
(0.0155) 
-4.5e-05**
(1.9e-05) 
ClassSize -0.0060*
(0.0036) 
-0.0061*
(0.0034) 
-1.4313
(3.3456) 
-0.0053
(0.0036) 
-0.8806
(3.5568) 
-0.0048
(0.0037) 
-2.1335
(3.2621) 
-0.0059*
(0.0035) 
NoSchoolComm -0.0019
(0.0122) 
0.0016 
(0.0123) 
-0.7945
(11.3264)
-0.0047
(0.0121) 
3.1826 
(12.0494)
-0.0009
(0.0126) 
3.8519 
(11.3655)
-0.0004
(0.0120) 
Intercept 7.1681***
(0.1086) 
7.1384***
(0.1033) 
1292.06***
(98.8924)
7.1926***
(0.1048) 
1350.71***
(101.8907)
7.2344***
(0.1075) 
1240.14***
(93.7093)
7.1432***
(0.1017) 
R2 0.8816 0.8835 0.8878 0.8910 0.8695 0.8797 0.8774 0.8846 
n. Obs. 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 
Notes: The left-hand-side variable in all regressions is the price of a standardized and comparable single 
family house across 169 municipalities. Log indicates that the dependent variable is on a logarithmic scale. 
Robust standard errors using a White-Huber heteroskedasticity adjusted sandwich estimator in 
parenthesis. ** *  indicates significance levels of below 1 percent; * *  indicates significance levels between 
1 and 5 percent; * indicates significance levels between 5 and 10 percent. 
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 In specifications (3) and (4) we estimate models using municipal self-financing 
capacity as an indicator for municipal wealth. Self-financing capacity is a hotly 
discussed topic in Switzerland. The Statistical Office calculates a self-financing 
capacity measure for every community. This measure is constructed using a 
number of different accounts linked to amortization, expenditures and revenues 
and represents approximately a managerial Cash Flow. Contrary to net funds and 
municipal equity, self-financing capacity depends strongly on the current income 
tax rate. Additional reservations apply for this measure as financial equalization 
transfers depend on the self-financing capacity. Consequently, the measure might 
be biased downward for all communities. Specification (3) presents results of the 
simple amenity model, and in specification (4) we estimate a semi-logarithmic 
form. In both cases the self-financing capacity capitalizes positively and is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. 
In specifications (5) and (6) we consider a new measure of municipal assets 
and debts. The Statistical Office of the Canton of Zurich reports a net funds 
measure which includes accruals, deferrals and provisions. It is a rather volatile 
measure when analyzed on a yearly basis. Accruals and deferrals especially tend 
to change from December 31 to January 1, depending on bookkeeping 
practices. Net funds reported by the Statistical Office do not necessarily 
represent the long-term value of the assets a community has at its disposal and 
communal obligations are biased by differences between communities when 
treating deferrals. The net funds measure is widely used inside the office itself 
and also for its reports on communal finances, which makes it a widely-applied 
and recognized indicator in the Canton of Zurich. Thus, we use it for 
robustness tests. Net funds still capitalize positively and significantly as shown 
in specifications (5) and (6).  
To determine whether these four indicators of the communal financial 
situation have a multidimensional character, we employ principal component 
analysis. It turns out that the four variables – real net funds, net funds,  
self-financing, and debt repayment – can be represented as a one-dimensional 
construct (see Appendix Figure A1 for a factor map). The first component 
explains over 70% of the total variance, which indicates that the different 
indicators provide similar information on the latent variables concerning the 
financial situation of a community. We construct one principal component 
and use it as an independent variable in specifications (7) and (8). The results 
show that in both cases the component for net funds influences house prices 
positively and significantly. 
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 5. CONCLUSION 
Federalism is usually seen as a protector of the present generation. But does 
federalism also protect future generations from public debts? Debt 
capitalization represents a new and so far neglected constraint for sub-national 
government debts. It introduces a natural debt brake for local governments. 
While many citizens fear that debt financing of government expenditures 
burdens future generations, debt capitalization indicates that jurisdictions with 
larger net debts exhibit, ceteris paribus, lower property prices. Debt 
capitalization in property values is the more pronounced the less elastic land 
supply is and the more mobile the other factors of production are, i.e. 
capitalization is more important for local than for national debts. 
While the assumptions for the standard type of Ricardian equivalence to hold 
are quite demanding (see Barro, 1974, and the resulting discussion), we argue that debt 
capitalization in federal systems ensures a similar equivalence which works also 
with non-altruistic individuals. Non-altruistic individuals are not able to 
accumulate debts at the expense of future generations because real estate 
persists over time. The value of property depends on current and future taxes 
and public services as well as on a number of location-specific amenities. 
Individuals bid high prices for real estate in communities with persistently low 
taxes and high quality public goods. They know that low municipal net funds 
and low equity lead to higher taxes in the future as debts have to be repaid and 
reserves have to be replenished. Jurisdictions with larger net debts exhibit, 
ceteris paribus, lower property prices. Thus, the burden of local government 
debts is shouldered by current property owners.  
Using data for municipalities in the Swiss metropolitan district of Zurich, we 
test whether debt capitalization exists. Switzerland with its strong federal system 
is an ideal laboratory for this test. The Swiss federal court has ruled out the 
possibility of a municipal bail-out by higher government levels in the well-
publicized case of the community of Leukerbad. Moreover, Swiss municipalities 
have the option to levy income taxes via a municipal tax multiplier on the 
cantonal income tax, and they have free access to capital markets. Communal 
property management is a sacred issue of federalism as communities link it with 
sovereignty. A system of fiscal equalization exists in Switzerland as in most other 
developed federations, but compared to other countries fiscal equalization grants 
are relatively small. Finally, all municipalities in the Canton of Zurich use a 
modern and comparable harmonized accounting system which provides high 
quality measures for municipal debts, assets, and equity. 
Our empirical results confirm that local public assets and debts capitalize into 
property prices. Municipalities with higher debts also have lower property 
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 values. The effect is stable even when considering a large array of independent 
controls and differential hypotheses. In robustness tests we show that a 
number of other measures indicating a community’s financial situation 
capitalize positively, too. These results make a strong argument for the 
equivalence of taxes and debts at the local level in a federal system. 
The existence of debt capitalization has important implications for the theory 
of federalism. It provides a new and so far neglected argument in favor of 
federalism. Debt capitalization is likely to be more complete at the local than at 
the central level as labor is more mobile at the local than at the central level, 
thus leaving the burden of debts to present land owners, i.e. to members of the 
current generation. Therefore, debt capitalization provides for a natural and 
more effective brake for government debts at the local than at the central level. 
Thus, decentralized countries with a larger local budget share can be assumed 
to be less prone to opt for deficits and debts than centralized countries.  
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 APPENDIX:  Figure A1.  Factor Map of Variables Measuring  
Financial Situation of Community 
 
 
Notes: Four variables are employed in the Principal Component Analysis: RealNetFunds, Equity, NetFunds, 
SelfFinancing. The factor map indicates how variables used in the Principal Component Analysis load on the 
first two dimensions. The first component explains 72.1% of the observed variance and the four variables 
can be summarized by this component.  
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 APPENDIX:  Table A1. Data Description and Sources 
Variable Description and Source Mean Std.
HousePrice Price in 1000 Swiss Francs of standardized and comparable single 
family house. Cantonal Bank of Zurich. 
804.5000 133.5991
RealNetFunds Value in 1000 Swiss Francs of liquidities, assets and equipment 
minus regular obligations, short-term debts and long-term debts per 
capita from municipal balance sheets. GEFIS Financial Statistics; 
 Statistical Office, Canton of Zurich. 
4.3770 2.5651
Equity Equity per capita from municipal balance sheets. GEFIS Financial 
Statistics; Statistical Office, Canton of Zurich. 
4.1180 2.0131
NetFunds As RealNetFunds but including accruals, deferrals and provisions 
(official indicator). GEFIS Financial Statistics; Statistical Office, Canton of Zurich. 
2.1070 3.0102
SelfFinancing Official indicator for municipal self-financing capacity per capita.  
GEFIS Financial Statistics; Statistical Office, Canton of Zurich. 
672.4000 327.2910
Lake View on lake in number of hectares. Cantonal Bank of Zurich; Statistical 
Office, Canton of Zurich (GIS system). 
362.1000 871.8137
SWExposure Percentage of hectares with south and west exposure. Cantonal Bank  
of Zurich; Statistical Office, Canton of Zurich (GIS system). 
0.4283 0.2752
DistCenter Average time in minutes to Zurich main station. Cantonal Bank of Zurich; 
Statistical Office, Canton of Zurich (GIS system). 
26.8100 8.5909
DistShop Average distance to next shopping facility in meters. Cantonal Bank  
of Zurich; Statistical Office, Canton of Zurich (GIS system). 
1220.00 724.1391
Pollution Environmental damage as NO2 in microgram per cubic meter. 
Cantonal Bank of Zurich; Statistical Office, Canton of Zurich (GIS system). 
17.7700 4.1814
LandAvailable Unused construction area in square meters per capita. Statistical  
Office, Canton of Zurich. 
50.0100 23.0831
TaxRate Mean income tax rate (without churches). Statistical Office, Canton of 
Zurich. 
113.9000 14.0860
ExpAgg Aggregated expenditures for culture, health, administration and  
social well-being per capita. GEFIS Financial Statistics; Statistical Office, 
Canton of Zurich. 
541.2000 219.8125
DistSchool Average class size in primary school. Secretary for Education of the  
Canton of Zurich. 
864.7000 227.0660
ClassSize Average distance to schools in meters. Cantonal Bank of Zurich;  
Statistical Office, Canton of Zurich (GIS system). 
19.9000 1.4855
NoSchoolComm Dummy whether the school is managed by the community itself or a 
separate school community. Secretary for Education of the Canton of Zurich. 
0.1970 0.3934
Commuters Fraction of commuters outgoing over labor force in community. 
Statistical Office, Canton of Zurich. 
0.6890 0.0689
Density Population per square kilometer. Statistical Office, Canton of Zurich. 597.7000 599.1876
Unemployment Unemployment rate. Statistical Office, Canton of Zurich. 2.2310 0.8059
Income25 25th quartile income to tax of natural persons. Statistical Office,  
Canton of Zurich. 
26370.00 3523.24
Elderly Fraction of population over 65 years. Statistical Office, Canton of Zurich. 0.1258 0.0292
Employed3sector Percentage of labor force employed in third sector. Statistical Office, 
Canton of Zurich. 
0.6515 0.1234
Notes: Sources for variables are mentioned in the table. Means and standard deviations are based on 169 
averaged observations over 1998 to 2004. 
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 APPENDIX:  Table A2. Public Debts and Property Prices – Additional 
Robustness Tests 
Spec. 
(1) 
Spec. 
(2) 
Spec. 
(3) 
Spec. 
(4) 
Spec. 
(5) 
Spec. 
(6) 
Spec. 
(7) 
Spec. 
(8) 
Spec. 
(9) 
Spec. 
(10) 
Spec. 
(11) 
Spec. 
(12) 
RealNetFunds 4.4239**
(2.1275) 
4.4029**
(2.1245)
4.4452**
(2.0361) 
4.2953**
(2.1267) 
4.8533**
(2.0235) 
4.3618**
(2.0761) 
Equity  7.6637***
(2.6579) 
7.6843***
(2.6631)
7.5902***
(2.5535)
7.4609***
(2.6687) 
8.1335***
(2.5418) 
7.6405***
(2.6155) 
Location 
Controls  
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
TaxRate -2.5694***
(0.5085) 
-2.4749***
(0.4835) 
-2.6151***
(0.5057)
-2.4905***
(0.4903)
-2.3638***
(0.4989) 
-2.2617***
(0.4733)
-2.4482***
(0.5295) 
-2.3763***
(0.5081) 
-2.2502***
(0.5245) 
-2.1461***
(0.5027) 
-2.5917***
(0.5124) 
-2.4795***
(0.4925) 
ExpAgg 0.1918***
(0.0315) 
0.1871***
(0.0312) 
0.1896***
(0.0307)
0.1854***
(0.0297)
0.2078***
(0.0273) 
0.2060***
(0.0266)
0.1934***
(0.0296) 
0.1902***
(0.0293) 
0.1360***
(0.0252) 
0.1342***
(0.0246) 
0.1854***
(0.0282) 
0.1841***
(0.0274) 
DistSchool -0.0359**
(0.0159) 
-0.0347**
(0.0157) 
-0.0387**
(0.0162)
-0.0357**
(0.0160)
-0.0367**
(0.0161) 
-0.0345**
(0.0161)
-0.0349**
(0.0156) 
-0.0333**
(0.0154) 
-0.0358**
(0.0154) 
-0.0334**
(0.0154) 
-0.0381**
(0.0158) 
-0.0357**
(0.0157) 
ClassSize -2.0908
(3.3787) 
-2.2395
(3.1891) 
-2.3840
(3.3547)
-2.3407
(3.1815)
-4.4337
(3.7070) 
-4.4545
(3.5127)
-1.9612
(3.3092) 
-2.0877
(3.1434) 
-3.9071
(3.4435) 
-3.9388
(3.2541) 
-2.3229
(3.4369) 
-2.3727
(3.2338) 
NoSchool 
Comm 
2.2348
(11.5539)
6.1510
(11.5685)
2.5912
(11.6847)
6.2325
(11.6267)
5.4613
(11.2891)
9.3170
(11.3078)
2.8056
(11.6776)
6.4944
(11.6810)
0.2564
(11.6423)
4.4411
(11.6800)
2.0984
(11.6123)
6.0491
(11.6100)
Commuters 28.4212
(62.9221)
12.6098
(63.8728)
Density   -0.0030
(0.0152)
-0.0007
(0.0151)
Unemployment -21.3044***
(6.7999) 
-
21.0129***
(6.8230)
Income25       0.0015
(0.0016) 
0.0011
(0.0017) 
Elderly         560.4224***
(161.3782)
561.8883***
(158.5434)
Employed 
3sector 
9.7840
(36.8520)
6.6610
(37.5438)
Intercept 1234.00***
(120.3316)
1217.39***
(112.4670)
1259.71***
(99.8505)
1228.78***
(93.4412)
1219.08***
(103.8016)
1189.47***
(96.2732)
1203.23***
(116.4568)
1186.17***
(111.9656)
1164.21***
(105.9194)
1134.00***
(99.5960)
1253.93***
(108.1336)
1223.66***
(100.0190)
R2 0.8731 0.8763 0.8730 0.8762 0.8814 0.8844 0.8737 0.8766 0.8796 0.8830 0.8730 0.8763 
n. Obs. 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 
Notes: The left-hand-side variable in all regressions is the price of a standardized and comparable single family 
house across 169 municipalities. Robust standard errors using a White-Huber heteroskedasticity adjusted 
sandwich estimator in parenthesis. *** indicates significance levels of below 1 percent; ** indicates 
significance levels between 1 and 5 percent; * indicates significance levels between 5 and 10 percent. 
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